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Presentation
Presented at First Electrical Science Divisional Symposium, Indian Institute of Science.
This is joint work with Prof David Parkes, Harvard University.
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
13 years 10 months ago
2010
ACM
We study the design of truthful mechanisms that do not use payments for the generalized assignment problem (GAP) and its variants. An instance of the GAP consists of a bipartite g...
Publication
We study a problem of dynamic allocation without money. Agents have
arrivals and departures and strict preferences over items. Strategyproofness
requires the
use of an arriva...
WWW
2010
ACM
14 years 19 days ago
2010
ACM
Crowdsourcing is a new Web phenomenon, in which a firm takes a function once performed in-house and outsources it to a crowd, usually in the form of an open contest. Designing ef...
Publication
We study dynamic matching without money
when one side of the market is dynamic with arrivals and de-
partures and the other is static and agents have strict prefer-
ences over a...