68 search results - page 1 / 14 » Optimal Auctions for Spiteful Bidders |
AAAI
2012
11 years 7 months ago
2012
Designing revenue-optimal auctions for various settings is perhaps the most important, yet sometimes most elusive, problem in mechanism design. Spiteful bidders have been intensel...
EUMAS
2006
13 years 6 months ago
2006
We derive optimal bidding strategies for a global bidder who participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We first consider a model where...
IJCAI
2007
13 years 6 months ago
2007
We study the bidding behavior of spiteful agents who, contrary to the common assumption of selfinterest, maximize a convex combination of their own proļ¬t and their competitorsā...
AAAI
2010
13 years 6 months ago
2010
In many auctions, agents bid more aggressively than selfinterest would prescribe. This can be explained by spite, where the agent's utility not only increases in the agent�...
DAGSTUHL
2006
13 years 6 months ago
2006
In this paper, we derive optimal bidding strategies for a global bidder who participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We first conside...