68 search results - page 2 / 14 » Optimal Auctions for Spiteful Bidders |
SAGT
2009
Springer
13 years 12 months ago
2009
Springer
We study auctions whose bidders are embedded in a social or economic network. As a result, even bidders who do not win the auction themselves might derive utility from the auction,...
ATAL
2007
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2007
Springer
In a dynamic market, being able to update one’s value based on information available to other bidders currently in the market can be critical to having profitable transactions. ...
Publication
Abstract: The current art in optimal combinatorial auctions is limited to handling the case of single units of multiple items, with each bidder bidding on exactly one bundle (singl...
CORR
2010
Springer
13 years 2 months ago
2010
Springer
We revisit the problem of designing the profit-maximizing single-item auction, solved by Myerson in his seminal paper for the case in which bidder valuations are independently dis...
FOCS
2002
IEEE
13 years 10 months ago
2002
IEEE
We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each bidder may only transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider both welfare- and profit-max...