In AI research, mechanism design is typically used to allocate tasks and resources to agents holding private information about their values for possible allocations. In this conte...
Lachlan Thomas Dufton, Victor Naroditskiy, Maria P...
In group decision-making problems that involve selfinterested agents with private information, reaching socially optimal outcomes requires aligning the goals of individuals with t...
We consider the problem of picking (buying) an inexpensive s-t path in a graph where edges are owned by independent (selfish) agents, and the cost of an edge is known to its owner...
In this thesis, we describe a decentralized supply chain formation problem where the
supply chain planner or a central design authority (CDA) is faced with the decision
of choosi...
The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with game-theoretic versions of optimization problems to which standard economic money-based mechanisms cannot b...