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MOBICOM
2006
ACM
13 years 11 months ago
OURS: optimal unicast routing systems in non-cooperative wireless networks
We propose novel solutions for unicast routing in wireless networks consisted of selfish terminals: in order to alleviate the inevitable over-payment problem (and thus economic i...
Weizhao Wang, Xiang-Yang Li, Stephan Eidenbenz, Yu...
FOCS
2003
IEEE
13 years 10 months ago
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
This paper analyzes implementable social choice functions (in dominant strategies) over restricted domains of preferences, the leading example being combinatorial auctions. Our wo...
Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'alem, Noam Nisan
ESA
2008
Springer
124views Algorithms» more  ESA 2008»
13 years 7 months ago
Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
A truthful mechanism consists of an algorithm augmented with a suitable payment function which guarantees that the "players" cannot improve their utilities by "chea...
Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre
INFOCOM
2011
IEEE
12 years 8 months ago
Strategyproof auctions for balancing social welfare and fairness in secondary spectrum markets
Abstract—Secondary spectrum access is emerging as a promising approach for mitigating the spectrum scarcity in wireless networks. Coordinated spectrum access for secondary users ...
Ajay Gopinathan, Zongpeng Li, Chuan Wu
AAAI
2010
13 years 6 months ago
Computationally Feasible Automated Mechanism Design: General Approach and Case Studies
In many multiagent settings, a decision must be made based on the preferences of multiple agents, and agents may lie about their preferences if this is to their benefit. In mechan...
Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer