We consider the problem of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanism design in settings where agents' types evolve over time as a function of their (both public and private) experien...
The existing literature on optimal auctions focuses on optimizing the expected revenue of the seller, and is appropriate for risk-neutral sellers. In this paper, we identify good ...
Abstract—In the Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) cloud computing market, spot instances refer to virtual servers that are rented via an auction. Spot instances allow IaaS provi...
Recent work on online auctions for digital goods has explored the role of optimal stopping theory — particularly secretary problems — in the design of approximately optimal on...
Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Tu...
Abstract. In this paper we introduce a new option pricing mechanism for reducing the exposure problem encountered by bidding agents with complementary valuations when participating...
Valentin Robu, Ioannis A. Vetsikas, Enrico H. Gerd...