We give a simple analysis of the competitive ratio of the random sampling auction from [10]. The random sampling auction was first shown to be worst-case competitive in [9] (with ...
Uriel Feige, Abraham Flaxman, Jason D. Hartline, R...
—Dynamic spectrum allocation has proven promising for mitigating the spectrum scarcity problem. In this model, primary users lease chunks of under-utilized spectrum to secondary ...
We study sequential auctions for private value objects and unit-demand bidders using second-price sealed-bid rules. We analyze this scenario from the seller’s perspective and con...
We consider truthful online auctions that aim at optimizing sellers’ revenues, representing service contributors’ satisfactions, as a general model for pricing peer-to-peer se...
Designing revenue-optimal auctions for various settings is perhaps the most important, yet sometimes most elusive, problem in mechanism design. Spiteful bidders have been intensel...