We investigate the price of anarchy of a load balancing game with K dispatchers. The service rates and holding costs are assumed to depend on the server, and the service disciplin...
As defined by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We give tight bounds on the strong price of anarchy for loa...
Imagine a set of self-interested clients, each of whom must choose a server from a permissible set. A server’s latency is inversely proportional to its speed, but it grows linear...
We study the impact of collusion in network games with splittable flow and focus on the well established price of anarchy as a measure of this impact. We first investigate symmet...
: Network games play a fundamental role in understanding behavior in many domains, ranging from communication networks through markets to social networks. Such networks are used, a...