Users who join a peer-to-peer network have, in general, suboptimal incentives to contribute to the network, because of the externalities that exist between them. The result is an ...
Panayotis Antoniadis, Costas Courcoubetis, Robin M...
We consider the problem of designing mechanisms for online problems in which agents arrive over time and the mechanism is unaware of the agent until the agent announces her arriva...
— This paper studies an auction based allocation of network resources for short-term contracts for heterogeneous network services. The combinatorial winner selection yields the o...
—We study the optimal usage-based pricing problem in a resource-bounded network with one profit-maximizing service provider and multiple groups of surplus-maximizing users. We ...
Dynamic pricing schemes in telecommunication networks were traditionally employed to create users’ incentives in such a way that the overall utilization is improved and profits a...