We consider a cost sharing system where users are selfish and act according to their own interest. There is a set of facilities and each facility provides services to a subset of ...
Niv Buchbinder, Liane Lewin-Eytan, Joseph Naor, Ar...
We consider a game-theoretical variant of the Steiner forest problem in which each player j, out of a set of k players, strives to connect his terminal pair (sj, tj) of vertices in...
In this paper we study the mechanism design problem of coalition formation and cost sharing in an electronic marketplace, where buyers can form coalitions to take advantage of dis...
We provide a new technique to derive group strategyproof mechanisms for the cost-sharing problem. Our technique is simpler and provably more powerful than the existing one based on...
In mobile networks, authentication is a required primitive of the majority of security protocols. However, an adversary can track the location of mobile nodes by monitoring pseudo...
Julien Freudiger, Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, Jean-...