Sciweavers

262 search results - page 2 / 53
» Robust mechanisms for information elicitation
Sort
View
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
143views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
13 years 10 months ago
Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can submit bids on bundles of items, are economically efï¬cient mechanisms for selling items to bidders, and are attractive when the biddersâ...
Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm
WEBI
2004
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
Eliciting Truthful Feedback for Binary Reputation Mechanisms
Reputation mechanisms offer an efï¬cient way of building the necessary level of trust in electronic markets. Feedback about an agent’s past behavior can be aggregated into a me...
Radu Jurca, Boi Faltings
IJISEC
2007
119views more  IJISEC 2007»
13 years 5 months ago
An incentive compatible reputation mechanism for ubiquitous computing environments
The vision of ubiquitous computing is becoming a reality thanks to the advent of portable devices and the advances in wireless networking technologies. It aims to facilitate user ...
Jinshan Liu, Valérie Issarny
AMAI
2005
Springer
13 years 5 months ago
Auction design with costly preference elicitation
We consider auction design in a setting with costly preference elicitation. Well designed auctions can help to avoid unnecessary elicitation while determining efficient allocations...
David C. Parkes
GRID
2007
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
Eliciting honest value information in a batch-queue environment
Abstract— Markets and auctions have been proposed as mechanisms for efï¬ciently and fairly allocating resources in a number of different computational settings. Economic approac...
Andrew Mutz, Richard Wolski, John Brevik