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HICSS
2007
IEEE
141views Biometrics» more  HICSS 2007»
13 years 11 months ago
Second-Best Combinatorial Auctions - The Case of the Pricing-Per-Column Mechanism
One of the main contributions of classical mechanism design is the derivation of the Groves mechanisms. The class of Groves mechanisms are the only mechanisms that are strategy-pr...
Dirk Neumann, Björn Schnizler, Ilka Weber, Ch...
ATAL
2010
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
Parameterizing the winner determination problem for combinatorial auctions
Combinatorial auctions have been studied by the multiagent systems community for some time, since these auctions are an effective mechanism for resource allocation when agents are...
David Loker, Kate Larson
ICALP
2010
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
On the Limitations of Greedy Mechanism Design for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
We study the combinatorial auction (CA) problem, in which m objects are sold to rational agents and the goal is to maximize social welfare. Of particular interest is the special ca...
Allan Borodin, Brendan Lucier
WINE
2010
Springer
134views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
13 years 3 months ago
Truthful Mechanisms for Exhibitions
We consider the following combinatorial auction: Given a range space (U, R), and m bidders interested in buying only ranges in R, each bidder j declares her bid bj : R R+. We give...
George Christodoulou, Khaled M. Elbassioni, Mahmou...
CORR
2010
Springer
147views Education» more  CORR 2010»
13 years 5 months ago
Single Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations
We consider the problem of designing truthful auctions, when the bidders' valuations have a public and a private component. In particular, we consider combinatorial auctions w...
Gagan Goel, Chinmay Karande, Lei Wang