Bellare, Canetti and Krawczyk proposed a security model (BCK-model) for authentication and key exchange protocols in 1998. The model not only reasonably captures the power of pract...
In this paper we study security definitions for authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols. We observe that there are several families of attacks on AKE protocols that lie outsid...
Brian A. LaMacchia, Kristin Lauter, Anton Mityagin
Public key based authentication and key exchange protocols are not usually designed with privacy in mind and thus involve cleartext exchanges of identities and certificates before ...
It is well known that a malicious adversary can try to retrieve secret information by inducing a fault during cryptographic operations. Following the work of Seifert on fault induc...
Protocols for authenticated key exchange (AKE) allow parties within an insecure network to establish a common session key which can then be used to secure their future communicati...