We extend the well-known Tree-Diffie-Hellman technique used for the design of group key exchange (GKE) protocols with robustness, i.e. with resistance to faults resulting from poss...
We consider the fundamental problem of authenticated group key exchange among n parties within a larger and insecure public network. A number of solutions to this problem have bee...
Bellare, Canetti and Krawczyk proposed a security model (BCK-model) for authentication and key exchange protocols in 1998. The model not only reasonably captures the power of pract...
Abstract—Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols are designed to be secure even when the secret key used for authentication is a human-memorable password. In this pa...
In this paper we study security definitions for authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols. We observe that there are several families of attacks on AKE protocols that lie outsid...
Brian A. LaMacchia, Kristin Lauter, Anton Mityagin