Extensive games are a powerful model of multiagent decision-making scenarios with incomplete information. Finding a Nash equilibrium for very large instances of these games has re...
Martin Zinkevich, Michael Johanson, Michael H. Bow...
We provide efficient algorithms for finding approximate BayesNash equilibria (BNE) in graphical, specifically tree, games of incomplete information. In such games an agent’s p...
Satinder P. Singh, Vishal Soni, Michael P. Wellman
This paper considers the robustness of equilibria to a small amount of incomplete information, where players are allowed to have heterogenous priors. An equilibrium of a complete ...
This study aims to design a new co-evolution algorithm, Mixture Co-evolution which enables modeling of integration and composition of direct co-evolution and indirect coevolution....
In repeated games with incomplete information, rational agents must carefully weigh the tradeoffs of advantageously exploiting their information to achieve a short-term gain versu...