In this paper, we consider the design of an agent that is able to autonomously make optimal bundling decisions when selling multiple heterogeneous items within existing online auc...
Ioannis A. Vetsikas, Alex Rogers, Nicholas R. Jenn...
Consider selling bundles of indivisible goods to buyers with concave utilities that are additively separable in money and goods. We propose an ascending auction for the case when ...
Sushil Bikhchandani, Sven de Vries, James Schummer...
We introduce a new type of combinatorial auction that allows agents to bid for goods to buy, for goods to sell, and for transformations of goods. One such transformation can be se...
We study auctions for selling a limited supply of a single commodity in the case where the supply is known in advance and the case it is unknown and must be instead allocated in a...
— This paper studies an auction based allocation of network resources for short-term contracts for heterogeneous network services. The combinatorial winner selection yields the o...