A leakage-resilient cryptosystem remains secure even if arbitrary, but bounded, information about the secret key (or possibly other internal state information) is leaked to an adv...
The strongest standard security notion for digital signature schemes is unforgeability under chosen message attacks. In practice, however, this notion can be insufficient due to ...
Sebastian Faust, Eike Kiltz, Krzysztof Pietrzak, G...
We study the design of cryptographic primitives resilient to key-leakage attacks, where an attacker can repeatedly and adaptively learn information about the secret key, subject o...
We present a generic method to secure various widely-used cryptosystems against arbitrary side-channel leakage, as long as the leakage adheres three restrictions: first, it is bou...
We construct a stream-cipher SC whose implementation is secure even if a bounded amount of arbitrary (adaptively, adversarially chosen) information about the internal state of SC ...