3 search results - page 1 / 1 » Small Coalitions Cannot Manipulate Voting |
FC
2005
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2005
Springer
We demonstrate how to make voting protocols resistant against manipulation by computationally bounded malicious voters, by extending the previous results of Conitzer and Sandholm i...
CORR
2002
Springer
13 years 4 months ago
2002
Springer
In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal r...
AAAI
2010
13 years 6 months ago
2010
We consider approval voting elections in which each voter votes for a (possibly empty) set of candidates and the outcome consists of a set of k candidates for some parameter k, e....