4 search results - page 1 / 1 » Social Welfare in One-sided Matching Markets without Money |
CORR
2011
Springer
12 years 11 months ago
2011
Springer
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
13 years 9 months ago
2010
ACM
We study the design of truthful mechanisms that do not use payments for the generalized assignment problem (GAP) and its variants. An instance of the GAP consists of a bipartite g...
JACM
2006
13 years 4 months ago
2006
In this article, we study the problem of online market clearing where there is one commodity in the market being bought and sold by multiple buyers and sellers whose bids arrive an...
Publication
We study dynamic matching without money
when one side of the market is dynamic with arrivals and de-
partures and the other is static and agents have strict prefer-
ences over a...