11 search results - page 2 / 3 » Stability and Incentive Compatibility in a Kernel-Based Comb... |
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 5 months ago
2008
ACM
We characterize truthful mechanisms in two multi-parameter domains. The first characterization shows that every mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two subadditive bidders t...
SAGT
2009
Springer
14 years 15 days ago
2009
Springer
Roberts’ theorem from 1979 states that the only incentive compatible mechanisms over a full domain and range of at least 3 are weighted variants of the VCG mechanism termed affin...
STOC
2005
ACM
14 years 6 months ago
2005
ACM
We exhibit three approximation algorithms for the allocation problem in combinatorial auctions with complement free bidders. The running time of these algorithms is polynomial in ...
FC
2004
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2004
Springer
This paper presents a secure Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) scheme that does not require third-party servers, i.e., the scheme is executed only by an auctioneer and bidders. Com...
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
13 years 11 months ago
2003
ACM
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can submit bids on bundles of items, are economically efficient mechanisms for selling items to bidders, and are attractive when the bidders...