In this paper, we focus on mechanism design for single leader Stackelberg problems, which are a special case of hierarchical decision making problems in which a distinguished agent...
In a class of games known as Stackelberg games, one agent (the leader) must commit to a strategy that can be observed by the other agent (the follower or adversary) before the adv...
Praveen Paruchuri, Jonathan P. Pearce, Janusz Mare...
In many scenarios network design is not enforced by a central authority, but arises from the interactions of several self-interested agents. This is the case of the Internet, wher...
Jocelyne Elias, Fabio Martignon, Konstantin Avrach...
—In many scenarios network design is not enforced by a central authority, but arises from the interactions of several self-interested agents. This is the case of the Internet, wh...
Jocelyne Elias, Fabio Martignon, Konstantin Avrach...
The problem of non-cooperative resource allocation in an amplifyand-forward relay-assisted DS/CDMA system is addressed. The relay designs its amplify-and-forward matrix for achiev...