3 search results - page 1 / 1 » Strategic deliberation and truthful revelation: an impossibi... |
SIGECOM
2004
ACM
13 years 10 months ago
2004
ACM
In many market settings, agents do not know their preferences a priori. Instead, they may have to solve computationally complex optimization problems, query databases, or perform ...
SAGT
2009
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2009
Springer
Abstract. A mechanism is manipulable if it is in some agents’ best interest to misrepresent their private information. The revelation principle establishes that, roughly, anythin...
AMEC
2004
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2004
Springer
Abstract. In many settings, bidding agents for auctions do not know their preferences a priori. Instead, they must actively determine them through deliberation (e.g., information p...