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ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
Strategic voting when aggregating partially ordered preferences
Preferences of a single agent are often partially ordered. For example, it may be hard to compare a novel with a biography. In such a situation, the agent may want the novel and t...
Maria Silvia Pini, Francesca Rossi, Kristen Brent ...
CORR
2011
Springer
148views Education» more  CORR 2011»
12 years 8 months ago
Dominating Manipulations in Voting with Partial Information
We consider manipulation problems when the manipulator only has partial information about the votes of the nonmanipulators. Such partial information is described by an information...
Vincent Conitzer, Toby Walsh, Lirong Xia
AAAI
2004
13 years 6 months ago
A Computational Study of the Kemeny Rule for Preference Aggregation
We consider from a computational perspective the problem of how to aggregate the ranking preferences of a number of alternatives by a number of different voters into a single cons...
Andrew J. Davenport, Jayant Kalagnanam
TARK
2005
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
Unconditional privacy in social choice
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is an important issue in human society and multiagent systems. Due to its universality, voting among a set of alternatives has a centra...
Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm
CORR
2002
Springer
108views Education» more  CORR 2002»
13 years 4 months ago
Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness
Preference elicitation is a central problem in AI, and has received significant attention in single-agent settings. It is also a key problem in multiagent systems, but has receive...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm