Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms, lying in the core, that recover 1/a fraction of the cost, are presented for the set cover and facility location games: a=O(log n) for the fo...
Nikhil R. Devanur, Milena Mihail, Vijay V. Vaziran...
Abstract. We develop for set cover games several general cost-sharing methods that are approximately budget-balanced, core, and/or group-strategyproof. We first study the cost sha...
We study Facility Location games, where a number of facilities are placed in a metric space based on locations reported by strategic agents. A mechanism maps the agents' locat...
We consider a cost sharing system where users are selfish and act according to their own interest. There is a set of facilities and each facility provides services to a subset of ...
Niv Buchbinder, Liane Lewin-Eytan, Joseph Naor, Ar...