Mediators are third parties to whom the players in a game can delegate the task of choosing a strategy; a mediator forms a mediated equilibrium if delegating is a best response for...
Joshua R. Davis, David Liben-Nowell, Alexa Sharp, ...
As defined by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We give tight bounds on the strong price of anarchy for loa...
A strong equilibrium (Aumann 1959) is a pure Nash equilibrium which is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We define the strong price of anarchy to be the ratio of the worst c...
This paper is a comparative study of game-theoretic solution concepts in strictly competitive multiagent scenarios, as commonly encountered in the context of parlor games, competi...
Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Paul Harrenstein, ...