We exhibit the rich structure of the set of correlated equilibria by analyzing the simplest of polynomial games: the mixed extension of matching pennies. We show that while the co...
Noah D. Stein, Asuman E. Ozdaglar, Pablo A. Parril...
We present several new characterizations of correlated equilibria in games with continuous utility functions. These have the advantage of being more computationally and analytical...
Noah D. Stein, Pablo A. Parrilo, Asuman E. Ozdagla...
Correlated equilibria are a generalization of Nash equilibria that permit agents to act in a correlated manner and can therefore, model learning in games. In this paper we define...
We examine correlated equilibria in the recently introduced formalism of graphical games, a succinct representation for multiplayer games. We establish a natural and powerful rela...
Sham Kakade, Michael J. Kearns, John Langford, Lui...
The problem of learning tree-structured Gaussian graphical models from independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) samples is considered. The influence of the tree structure a...
Vincent Y. F. Tan, Animashree Anandkumar, Alan S. ...