A Tool: Causality-based Abstraction for Security Protocol Analysis (Tool Paper) Michael Backes1,2 , Stefan Lorenz1 , Matteo Maffei1 , and Kim Pecina1 1 Saarland University, Saarbr
Michael Backes, Stefan Lorenz, Matteo Maffei, Kim ...
Abstract. Non-repudiation protocols with session labels have a number of vulnerabilities. Recently Cederquist, Corin and Dashti have proposed an optimistic non-repudiation protocol...
Abstract. We present a formalism for the analysis of key-exchange protocols that combines previous definitional approaches and results in a definition of security that enjoys som...
d abstract) Prateek Gupta and Vitaly Shmatikov The University of Texas at Austin We present a cryptographically sound formal method for proving correctness of key exchange protoco...
Abstract. We present a symbolic framework, based on a modular operational semantics, for formalizing different notions of compromise relevant for the analysis of cryptographic prot...