29 search results - page 1 / 6 » The price of truthfulness for pay-per-click auctions |
SIGECOM
2011
ACM
12 years 7 months ago
2011
ACM
In this paper, we study the class of competitive equilibria in two sided matching markets with general (non-quasilinear) utility functions. Mechanism design in general non-quasili...
WECWIS
2005
IEEE
13 years 10 months ago
2005
IEEE
We consider truthful online auctions that aim at optimizing sellers’ revenues, representing service contributors’ satisfactions, as a general model for pricing peer-to-peer se...
IJCAI
2007
13 years 6 months ago
2007
We study the bidding behavior of spiteful agents who, contrary to the common assumption of selfinterest, maximize a convex combination of their own profit and their competitors...
SIGECOM
2006
ACM
13 years 10 months ago
2006
ACM
We present a truthful auction for pricing advertising slots on a web-page assuming that advertisements for different merchants must be ranked in decreasing order of their (weighte...
JAIR
2007
13 years 4 months ago
2007
In this paper we present and evaluate a general framework for the design of truthful auctions for matching agents in a dynamic, two-sided market. A single commodity, such as a res...