29 search results - page 2 / 6 » The price of truthfulness for pay-per-click auctions |
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
13 years 11 months ago
2009
ACM
We analyze the problem of designing a truthful pay-per-click auction where the click-through-rates (CTR) of the bidders are unknown to the auction. Such an auction faces the class...
CORR
2008
Springer
13 years 5 months ago
2008
Springer
We consider the Offline Ad Slot Scheduling problem, where advertisers must be scheduled to sponsored search slots during a given period of time. Advertisers specify a budget constr...
WINE
2007
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2007
Springer
We study the frugality ratio of truthful mechanisms in path auctions, which measures the extent to which truthful mechanisms “overpay” compared to non-truthful mechanisms. In p...
WWW
2009
ACM
14 years 6 months ago
2009
ACM
Search auctions have become a dominant source of revenue generation on the Internet. Such auctions have typically used per-click bidding and pricing. We propose the use of hybrid ...
AIR
2004
13 years 5 months ago
2004
Ensuring truthfulness amongst self-interested agents bidding against one another in an auction can be computationally expensive when prices are determined using the Vickrey-Clarke-...