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» The price of truthfulness for pay-per-click auctions
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CN
2007
111views more  CN 2007»
13 years 5 months ago
An auction mechanism for allocating the bandwidth of networks to their users
We present a mechanism for auctioning bandwidth on a network-wide basis to end users or ISPs that will utilize it for the same time period. This mechanism consists of a set of sim...
Manos Dramitinos, George D. Stamoulis, Costas Cour...
IAT
2006
IEEE
13 years 12 months ago
Realising Common Knowledge Assumptions in Agent Auctions
Game theory is popular in agent systems for designing auctions with desirable properties. However, many of these properties will only hold if the game and its properties are commo...
Frank Guerin, Emmanuel M. Tadjouddine
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges
The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechan...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
ATAL
2007
Springer
13 years 12 months ago
On Revenue-Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values
In a dynamic market, being able to update one’s value based on information available to other bidders currently in the market can be critical to having profitable transactions. ...
Florin Constantin, David C. Parkes
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
110views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
14 years 9 days ago
On random sampling auctions for digital goods
In the context of auctions for digital goods, an interesting Random Sampling Optimal Price auction (RSOP) has been proposed by Goldberg, Hartline and Wright; this leads to a truth...
Saeed Alaei, Azarakhsh Malekian, Aravind Srinivasa...