Abstract. The stable marriage problem has many practical applications in twosided markets like those that assign doctors to hospitals, students to schools, or buyers to vendors. Mo...
Enrico Pilotto, Francesca Rossi, Kristen Brent Ven...
Abstract. We consider the variant of the classical Stable Marriage problem where preference lists can be incomplete and may contain ties. In such a setting, finding a stable matchi...
The stable marriage (SM) problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools, or more genera...
Mirco Gelain, Maria Silvia Pini, Francesca Rossi, ...
The original stable marriage problem requires all men and women to submit a complete and strictly ordered preference list. This is obviously often unrealistic in practice, and seve...
Kazuo Iwama, David Manlove, Shuichi Miyazaki, Yasu...
We consider the Stable Marriage Problem and the Stable Roommates Problem in presence of ties and incomplete preference lists. They can be solved by centralized algorithms, but this...