22 search results - page 1 / 5 » Truth Revelation in Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Au... |
CORR
2002
Springer
13 years 4 months ago
2002
Springer
ATAL
2004
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
2004
Springer
Combinatorial auctions, where agents can bid on bundles of items (resources, tasks, etc.), are desirable because the agents can express complementarity and substitutability among ...
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
13 years 9 months ago
2003
ACM
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can submit bids on bundles of items, are economically efficient mechanisms for selling items to bidders, and are attractive when the bidders...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
We characterize truthful mechanisms in two multi-parameter domains. The first characterization shows that every mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two subadditive bidders t...
ICALP
2010
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
2010
Springer
We study the combinatorial auction (CA) problem, in which m objects are sold to rational agents and the goal is to maximize social welfare. Of particular interest is the special ca...