7 search results - page 1 / 2 » Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents |
FOCS
2008
IEEE
14 years 3 days ago
2008
IEEE
CORR
2010
Springer
13 years 5 months ago
2010
Springer
We consider the problem of designing truthful auctions, when the bidders' valuations have a public and a private component. In particular, we consider combinatorial auctions w...
AAIM
2005
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2005
Springer
In this paper we study the set cover games when the elements are selfish agents. In this case, each element has a privately known valuation of receiving the service from the sets,...
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
13 years 11 months ago
2005
ACM
The family of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms is arguably the most celebrated achievement in truthful mechanism design. However, VCG mechanisms have their limitations. They...
TCS
2010
13 years 11 days ago
2010
We consider the problem of maximizing the minimum load for machines that are controlled by selfish agents, who are only interested in maximizing their own profit. Unlike the class...