Double auction prediction markets have proven successful in large-scale applications such as elections and sporting events. Consequently, several large corporations have adopted t...
Paul J. Healy, Sera Linardi, J. Richard Lowery, Jo...
In this paper we present and evaluate a general framework for the design of truthful auctions for matching agents in a dynamic, two-sided market. A single commodity, such as a res...
We study a multi-unit auction with multiple bidders, each of whom has a private valuation and a budget. The truthful mechanisms of such an auction are characterized, in the sense ...
Christian Borgs, Jennifer T. Chayes, Nicole Immorl...
To improve the resource utilization and satisfy more users, a Greedy Double Auction Mechanism(GDAM) is proposed to allocate resources in grid environments. GDAM trades resources at...
We characterize truthful mechanisms in two multi-parameter domains. The first characterization shows that every mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two subadditive bidders t...