12 search results - page 1 / 3 » Truthful assignment without money |
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
13 years 9 months ago
2010
ACM
We study the design of truthful mechanisms that do not use payments for the generalized assignment problem (GAP) and its variants. An instance of the GAP consists of a bipartite g...
Publication
We study a problem of dynamic allocation without money. Agents have
arrivals and departures and strict preferences over items. Strategyproofness
requires the
use of an arriva...
Presentation
Presented at First Electrical Science Divisional Symposium, Indian Institute of Science.
This is joint work with Prof David Parkes, Harvard University.
Presentation
This was presentation given by James Zou at AAAI 2010. (Slides are created by him)
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
13 years 11 months ago
2009
ACM
The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with game-theoretic versions of optimization problems to which standard economic money-based mechanisms cannot b...