24 search results - page 2 / 5 » Truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation |
CORR
2010
Springer
13 years 3 months ago
2010
Springer
Following Babaioff, Kleinberg, and Slivkins [4], we study single-call mechanisms — truthful mechanisms that evaluate an allocation function only once per instantiation. First, w...
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
13 years 11 months ago
2009
ACM
The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with game-theoretic versions of optimization problems to which standard economic money-based mechanisms cannot b...
MFCS
2009
Springer
13 years 12 months ago
2009
Springer
Algorithmic mechanism design considers distributed settings where the participants, termed agents, cannot be assumed to follow the protocol but rather their own interests. The pro...
ICPP
2008
IEEE
13 years 11 months ago
2008
IEEE
We design an incentive-compatible mechanism for scheduling n non-malleable parallel jobs on a parallel system comprising m identical processors. Each job is owned by a selfish us...
CLUSTER
2002
IEEE
13 years 10 months ago
2002
IEEE
Computational Grids are large scale computing system composed of geographically distributed resources (computers, storage etc.) owned by self interested agents or organizations. T...