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» Truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation
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MOBIHOC
2009
ACM
14 years 17 days ago
Revenue generation for truthful spectrum auction in dynamic spectrum access
Spectrum is a critical yet scarce resource and it has been shown that dynamic spectrum access can significantly improve spectrum utilization. To achieve this, it is important to ...
Juncheng Jia, Qian Zhang, Qin Zhang, Mingyan Liu
STACS
2005
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
Cost Sharing and Strategyproof Mechanisms for Set Cover Games
Abstract. We develop for set cover games several general cost-sharing methods that are approximately budget-balanced, core, and/or group-strategyproof. We first study the cost sha...
Xiang-Yang Li, Zheng Sun, Weizhao Wang
SIGECOM
2004
ACM
112views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2004»
13 years 11 months ago
Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions
Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to m...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
141views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
13 years 11 months ago
Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer
Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to m...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
ACMICEC
2003
ACM
172views ECommerce» more  ACMICEC 2003»
13 years 11 months ago
Automated mechanism design: complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism ...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm