31 search results - page 1 / 7 » Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions |
STOC
2006
ACM
14 years 5 months ago
2006
ACM
WINE
2010
Springer
13 years 2 months ago
2010
Springer
We consider the following combinatorial auction: Given a range space (U, R), and m bidders interested in buying only ranges in R, each bidder j declares her bid bj : R R+. We give...
WINE
2007
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2007
Springer
This paper characterizes the family of truthful doublesided auctions. Despite the importance of double-sided auctions to market design, to date no characterization of truthful dou...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
We characterize truthful mechanisms in two multi-parameter domains. The first characterization shows that every mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two subadditive bidders t...
SIGECOM
2004
ACM
13 years 10 months ago
2004
ACM
Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to m...