31 search results - page 2 / 7 » Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions |
ICALP
2010
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
2010
Springer
We study the combinatorial auction (CA) problem, in which m objects are sold to rational agents and the goal is to maximize social welfare. Of particular interest is the special ca...
FOCS
2005
IEEE
13 years 11 months ago
2005
IEEE
We give a general technique to obtain approximation mechanisms that are truthful in expectation. We show that for packing domains, any α-approximation algorithm that also bounds ...
FOCS
2003
IEEE
13 years 10 months ago
2003
IEEE
This paper analyzes implementable social choice functions (in dominant strategies) over restricted domains of preferences, the leading example being combinatorial auctions. Our wo...
CORR
2011
Springer
13 years 9 days ago
2011
Springer
In Combinatorial Public Projects, there is a set of projects that may be undertaken, and a set of selfinterested players with a stake in the set of projects chosen. A public plann...
FOCS
2009
IEEE
14 years 1 days ago
2009
IEEE
In many settings the power of truthful mechanisms is severely bounded. In this paper we use randomization to overcome this problem. In particular, we construct an FPTAS for multi-...