31 search results - page 3 / 7 » Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions |
WINE
2007
Springer
14 years 4 days ago
2007
Springer
We study the frugality ratio of truthful mechanisms in path auctions, which measures the extent to which truthful mechanisms “overpay” compared to non-truthful mechanisms. In p...
CORR
2008
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
2008
Springer
The unsplittable flow problem is one of the most extensively studied optimization problems in the field of networking. An instance of it consists of an edge capacitated graph and ...
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
13 years 11 months ago
2003
ACM
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can submit bids on bundles of items, are economically efficient mechanisms for selling items to bidders, and are attractive when the bidders...
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
2006
Springer
The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechan...
CORR
2010
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
2010
Springer
We consider the problem of designing truthful auctions, when the bidders' valuations have a public and a private component. In particular, we consider combinatorial auctions w...