12 search results - page 1 / 3 » Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms |
ATAL
2008
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
2008
Springer
Many important problems in multiagent systems can be seen as resource allocation problems. For such problems, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is efficient, in...
CORR
2008
Springer
13 years 4 months ago
2008
Springer
A common objective in mechanism design is to choose the outcome (for example, allocation of resources) that maximizes the sum of the agents' valuations, without introducing in...
Presentation
Redistribution of VCG Payments in Assignments of Heterogeneous Objects
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
For the problem of allocating one or more items among a group of competing agents, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is strategy-proof and efficient. However, the VCG mech...
Publication
There are p heterogeneous objects to be assigned to n competing agents (n > p)
each with unit demand. It is required to design a Groves mechanism for this assignment problem
s...