In light of the growing complexity of cryptographic protocols and applications, it becomes highly desirable to mechanize — and eventually automate — the security analysis of p...
We put forward a framework for the modular design and analysis of multi-party protocols. Our framework is called “GNUC” (with the recursive meaning “GNUC’s Not UC”), alr...
Formal analysis of security protocols based on symbolic models has been very successful in finding flaws in published protocols and proving protocols secure, using automated too...
d abstract) Prateek Gupta and Vitaly Shmatikov The University of Texas at Austin We present a cryptographically sound formal method for proving correctness of key exchange protoco...
Abstract. Many real-world protocols, such as SSL/TLS, SSH, IPsec, IEEE 802.11i, DNSSEC, and Kerberos, derive new keys from other keys. To be able to analyze such protocols in a com...