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» Universally optimal privacy mechanisms for minimax agents
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FOCS
2007
IEEE
14 years 3 days ago
Mechanism Design via Differential Privacy
We study the role that privacy-preserving algorithms, which prevent the leakage of specific information about participants, can play in the design of mechanisms for strategic age...
Frank McSherry, Kunal Talwar
SAGT
2009
Springer
192views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2009»
14 years 9 days ago
Better with Byzantine: Manipulation-Optimal Mechanisms
Abstract. A mechanism is manipulable if it is in some agents’ best interest to misrepresent their private information. The revelation principle establishes that, roughly, anythin...
Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm
ATAL
2005
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
Decentralized voting with unconditional privacy
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a key issue in multiagent systems. Due to its universality, voting has a central role among preference aggregation mechanisms. Votin...
Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm
AAMAS
2010
Springer
13 years 5 months ago
Evolutionary mechanism design: a review
Abstract The advent of large-scale distributed systems poses unique engineering challenges. In open systems such as the internet it is not possible to prescribe the behaviour of al...
Steve Phelps, Peter McBurney, Simon Parsons
DALT
2008
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
Abstracting and Verifying Strategy-Proofness for Auction Mechanisms
ing and Verifying Strategy-proofness for Auction Mechanisms E. M. Tadjouddine, F. Guerin, and W. Vasconcelos Department of Computing Science, King's College, University of Abe...
Emmanuel M. Tadjouddine, Frank Guerin, Wamberto We...