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» Vicious strategies for Vickrey auctions
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ATAL
2001
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
Antisocial Agents and Vickrey Auctions
In recent years auctions have become more and more important in the field of multiagent systems as useful mechanisms for resource allocation and task assignment. In many cases the...
Felix Brandt, Gerhard Weiß
AIR
2004
111views more  AIR 2004»
13 years 5 months ago
Towards Fast Vickrey Pricing using Constraint Programming
Ensuring truthfulness amongst self-interested agents bidding against one another in an auction can be computationally expensive when prices are determined using the Vickrey-Clarke-...
Alan Holland, Barry O'Sullivan
AAAI
2000
13 years 6 months ago
Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment
Iterative auctions have many computational advantages over sealed-bid auctions, but can present new possibilities for strategic manipulation. We propose a two-stage technique to m...
David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar
DALT
2008
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
Abstracting and Verifying Strategy-Proofness for Auction Mechanisms
ing and Verifying Strategy-proofness for Auction Mechanisms E. M. Tadjouddine, F. Guerin, and W. Vasconcelos Department of Computing Science, King's College, University of Abe...
Emmanuel M. Tadjouddine, Frank Guerin, Wamberto We...
IAT
2008
IEEE
13 years 11 months ago
Beyond Quasi-linear Utility: Strategy/False-Name-Proof Multi-unit Auction Protocols
We develop strategy/false-name-proof multi-unit auction protocols for non-quasi-linear utilities. One almost universal assumption in auction theory literature is that each bidder ...
Yuko Sakurai, Yasumasa Saito, Atsushi Iwasaki, Mak...