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» Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness
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CORR
2002
Springer
108views Education» more  CORR 2002»
13 years 4 months ago
Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness
Preference elicitation is a central problem in AI, and has received significant attention in single-agent settings. It is also a key problem in multiagent systems, but has receive...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
ALDT
2011
Springer
200views Algorithms» more  ALDT 2011»
12 years 4 months ago
Vote Elicitation with Probabilistic Preference Models: Empirical Estimation and Cost Tradeoffs
A variety of preference aggregation schemes and voting rules have been developed in social choice to support group decision making. However, the requirement that participants provi...
Tyler Lu, Craig Boutilier
AAMAS
2012
Springer
12 years 6 days ago
Winner determination in voting trees with incomplete preferences and weighted votes
In multiagent settings where agents have different preferences, preference aggregation can be an important issue. Voting is a general method to aggregate preferences. We consider ...
Jérôme Lang, Maria Silvia Pini, Franc...
ATAL
2008
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
Complexity of terminating preference elicitation
Complexity theory is a useful tool to study computational issues surrounding the elicitation of preferences, as well as the strategic manipulation of elections aggregating togethe...
Toby Walsh
AAAI
2007
13 years 6 months ago
Uncertainty in Preference Elicitation and Aggregation
Uncertainty arises in preference aggregation in several ways. There may, for example, be uncertainty in the votes or the voting rule. Such uncertainty can introduce computational ...
Toby Walsh