5 search results - page 1 / 1 » Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms |
CORR
2008
Springer
13 years 5 months ago
2008
Springer
A common objective in mechanism design is to choose the outcome (for example, allocation of resources) that maximizes the sum of the agents' valuations, without introducing in...
ATAL
2008
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
2008
Springer
Many important problems in multiagent systems can be seen as resource allocation problems. For such problems, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is efficient, in...
WINE
2009
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2009
Springer
Abstract. We are interested in mechanisms that maximize social welfare. In [2] this problem was studied for multi-unit auctions and for public project problems, and in each case so...
CN
2007
13 years 5 months ago
2007
We present a mechanism for auctioning bandwidth on a network-wide basis to end users or ISPs that will utilize it for the same time period. This mechanism consists of a set of sim...
ATAL
2008
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
2008
Springer
We consider a multiagent resource allocation domain where the marginal production of each resource is diminishing. A set of identical, self-interested agents requires access to sh...