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WINE
2010
Springer
149views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
13 years 2 months ago
Winner-Imposing Strategyproof Mechanisms for Multiple Facility Location Games
We study Facility Location games, where a number of facilities are placed in a metric space based on locations reported by strategic agents. A mechanism maps the agents' locat...
Dimitris Fotakis, Christos Tzamos
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
92views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
13 years 10 months ago
Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover and facility location games
Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms, lying in the core, that recover 1/a fraction of the cost, are presented for the set cover and facility location games: a=O(log n) for the fo...
Nikhil R. Devanur, Milena Mihail, Vijay V. Vaziran...
WINE
2009
Springer
140views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
13 years 11 months ago
Tighter Bounds for Facility Games
In one dimensional facility games, public facilities are placed based on the reported locations of the agents, where all the locations of agents and facilities are on a real line. ...
Pinyan Lu, Yajun Wang, Yuan Zhou
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
216views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
13 years 11 months ago
Approximate mechanism design without money
The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with game-theoretic versions of optimization problems to which standard economic money-based mechanisms cannot b...
Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz