Sciweavers

AMEC
2004
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
A Budget-Balanced, Incentive-Compatible Scheme for Social Choice
Abstract. Many practical scenarios involve solving a social choice problem: a group of self-interested agents have to agree on an outcome that best fits their combined preferences...
Boi Faltings
AMEC
2004
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
A Mechanism for Multiple Goods and Interdependent Valuations
Abstract. This paper reports on the design of an auction mechanism for allocating multiple goods when the buyers have interdependent valuations. We cast the problem as a multi-agen...
Rajdeep K. Dash, Alex Rogers, Nicholas R. Jennings
AMEC
2004
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
Revenue Failures and Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges with VCG Payments
Abstract. In a combinatorial auction, there are multiple items for sale, and bidders are allowed to place a bid on a bundle of these items rather than just on the individual items....
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm