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EOR
2011
113views more  EOR 2011»
9 years 5 months ago
A relation-algebraic approach to simple games
Simple games are a powerful tool to analyze decision-making and coalition formation in social and political life. In this paper, we present relation-algebraic models of simple game...
Rudolf Berghammer, Stefan Bolus, Agnieszka Rusinow...
EOR
2011
140views more  EOR 2011»
9 years 5 months ago
Power indices of simple games and vector-weighted majority games by means of binary decision diagrams
A simple game is a pair consisting of a finite set N of players and a set W ⊆ 2N of winning coalitions. (Vector-)weighted majority games ((V)WMG) are a special case of simple ga...
Stefan Bolus
WINE
2010
Springer
154views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
9 years 8 months ago
The Good, The Bad and The Cautious: Safety Level Cooperative Games
Abstract. We study safety level coalitions in competitive games. Given a normal form game, we define a corresponding cooperative game with transferable utility, where the value of ...
Yoram Bachrach, Maria Polukarov, Nicholas R. Jenni...
CORR
2010
Springer
197views Education» more  CORR 2010»
9 years 9 months ago
Hedonic Coalition Formation for Distributed Task Allocation among Wireless Agents
—Autonomous wireless agents such as unmanned aerial vehicles, mobile base stations, or self-operating wireless nodes present a great potential for deployment in next-generation w...
Walid Saad, Zhu Han, Tamer Basar, Mérouane ...
CORR
2006
Springer
176views Education» more  CORR 2006»
9 years 10 months ago
On the Fingerprinting Capacity Under the Marking Assumption
Abstract--We address the maximum attainable rate of fingerprinting codes under the marking assumption, studying lower and upper bounds on the value of the rate for various sizes of...
N. Prasanth Anthapadmanabhan, Alexander Barg, Ilya...
CORR
2008
Springer
113views Education» more  CORR 2008»
9 years 10 months ago
Power Indices and minimal winning Coalitions
The Penrose-Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index are the best-known and the most used tools to measure political power of voters in simple voting games. Most methods to calc...
Werner Kirsch, Jessica Langner
CORR
2008
Springer
217views Education» more  CORR 2008»
9 years 10 months ago
A Distributed Merge and Split Algorithm for Fair Cooperation in Wireless Networks
Abstract-- This paper introduces a novel concept from coalitional game theory which allows the dynamic formation of coalitions among wireless nodes. A simple and distributed merge ...
Walid Saad, Zhu Han, Mérouane Debbah, Are H...
ANOR
2008
108views more  ANOR 2008»
9 years 10 months ago
A consensus model of political decision-making
In this paper, a model of political consensus is introduced. Parties try to reach consensus in forming a government. A government is defined as a pair consisting of a winning coali...
Patrik Eklund, Agnieszka Rusinowska, Harrie C. M. ...
ECAI
2010
Springer
9 years 10 months ago
On the stability of an Optimal Coalition Structure
The two main questions in coalition games are 1) what coalitions should form and 2) how to distribute the value of each coalition between its members. When a game is not superaddit...
Stéphane Airiau, Sandip Sen
ECAI
2008
Springer
10 years 6 days ago
Optimal Coalition Structure Generation In Partition Function Games
1 In multi-agent systems (MAS), coalition formation is typically studied using characteristic function game (CFG) representations, where the performance of any coalition is indepen...
Tomasz P. Michalak, Andrew Dowell, Peter McBurney,...
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