AAAI
2012
11 years 6 months ago
2012
Significant progress has been made recently in the following two lines of research in the intersection of AI and game theory: (1) the computation of optimal strategies to commit ...
SIGECOM
2011
ACM
12 years 7 months ago
2011
ACM
In a landmark paper, Papadimitriou and Roughgarden [2008] described a polynomial-time algorithm (“Ellipsoid Against Hope”) for computing sample correlated equilibria of concis...
ICASSP
2011
IEEE
12 years 8 months ago
2011
IEEE
Correlated equilibria are a generalization of Nash equilibria that permit agents to act in a correlated manner and can therefore, model learning in games. In this paper we define...
CORR
2008
Springer
13 years 4 months ago
2008
Springer
We present several new characterizations of correlated equilibria in games with continuous utility functions. These have the advantage of being more computationally and analytical...
CORR
2010
Springer
13 years 4 months ago
2010
Springer
We exhibit the rich structure of the set of correlated equilibria by analyzing the simplest of polynomial games: the mixed extension of matching pennies. We show that while the co...
AAAI
2010
13 years 5 months ago
2010
We consider risk-sensitive generalizations of Nash and correlated equilibria in noncooperative games. We prove that, except for a class of degenerate games, unless a two-player ga...
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
13 years 9 months ago
2003
ACM
We examine correlated equilibria in the recently introduced formalism of graphical games, a succinct representation for multiplayer games. We establish a natural and powerful rela...
ESA
2005
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
2005
Springer
We consider the price of stability for Nash and correlated equilibria of linear congestion games. The price of stability is the optimistic price of anarchy, the ratio of the cost ...
STOC
2005
ACM
14 years 4 months ago
2005
ACM
STOC
2009
ACM
14 years 4 months ago
2009
ACM
The price of anarchy (POA) is a worst-case measure of the inefficiency of selfish behavior, defined as the ratio of the objective function value of a worst Nash equilibrium of a g...